Research Overview
My research focuses on epistemic permissivism, its applications to epistemology of metaphysics, particularly metaphysical disagreement, and its interactions with morality, particularly credence wronging. I also work on the frequency-credence link in formal epistemology and the chance-frequency link in metaphysics.
- Epistemology: Epistemic permissivism; Credence-frequency link
- Epistemology of Metaphysics: Theoretical virtues in metaphysics; Peer disagreement in metaphysics
- Metaphysics: Laws of nature; Chance-frequency link
Publications
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Epistemic Permissivism and Risk Assessment in Irrationality, Mind (2026)
A popular version of epistemic Permissivism says that, given the total evidence, sometimes there is a
permissible credence range towards a proposition. Ginger Schultheis (2018) offers a Dominance Argument
against it. Schultheis argues that it is irrational to hold a credence at the edge of any permissible range
because the edge credence takes higher risks of being irrational than the credence in the middle. In this
paper, I propose two new responses. Firstly, I argue that after the risk assessment in irrationality, a new
stable range may emerge such that each credence from it does not take more risks than others. Schultheis’s
Dominance Argument can only shrink the original credence range to this new stable range. Second, I argue
that sometimes it is rational for us to hold a more risky credence when a safer alternative is available. If
rationality aims at truth-conduciveness and informativeness, a credence’s higher risks of being irrational
do not render it irrational when one risks being less truth-conducive in exchange for informativeness.
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In Progress
- A paper arguing that one’s rational credence can morally wrong others in cases of epistemic permissivism
- A paper arguing that theoretical virtues can be truth-conducive in science but fail to do so in metaphysics
- A paper defending that we should not be highly confident that our world is a computer simulation
Last Updated May 13, 2026